------- Index of Articles

NUCLEAR
Experts Discuss Chances of Nuclear Terrorism
India's Cabinet Approves Power Plant
Pakistan Scientists Questioned Again
Film shows French role in developing weapons
Are Nuclear Plants Secure?
Modifications proposed to Tri-Party Agreement
US, Russia Make Progress on Security

MILITARY
Taliban Had OKed Bin Laden Handover
Interview with former Soviet Air Force commander in Afghanistan
Pentagon tightens 'noose' on bin Laden
Special forces vet sees U.S. - Soviet parallels
Germ Weapons Plant Is Dismantled
Marine anti-terrorism unit makes comeback after hits

ENERGY AND OTHER
Delegates shape Kyoto Protocol's future
Prescribing Cipro Is 'Uncontrolled Experiment'

POLICE / PRISONERS
An Intelligence Giant in the Making
FBI Pleads for Help on Attacks
States Devising Plan for High-Tech National Identification Cards
National Guard to Be Deployed Outside Capitol
Spy Trials Challenge New Russia
Crackdown Expanded to All Groups in Terror List
FEMA Establishes Center in District

ACTIVISTS
Berkeley resolution stirs threat of boycott


-------- NUCLEAR

Experts Discuss Chances of Nuclear Terrorism
Tighter Controls on Atomic Materials Urgently Needed, Especially in Russia, U.N. Agency Told

By Peter Finn
Washington Post Foreign Service
Saturday, November 3, 2001; Page A19
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A32779-2001Nov2?language=printer

VIENNA, Nov. 2 -- A crude nuclear device could be detonated by some terrorist group, including Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda, which would have no qualms about using a weapon of mass destruction, weapons experts told the U.N. atomic agency at a conference here today.

Following the Sept. 11 attacks, Western countries, particularly the United States, must accelerate efforts to protect inadequately housed nuclear material that could easily -- and may already have -- fallen into the hands of terrorists, speakers at the conference said.

"The only strategy is to protect the material where it is," said Morten Bremer Maerli, a researcher at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. But, he added, implementation of that strategy "doesn't exist."

While building and setting off a nuclear device is technically difficult, those hurdles should not be overestimated. Suicidal extremists bent on mass destruction may be indifferent to the safety standards that mark government weapons programs.

One speaker quoted the late Manhattan Project researcher, Luis W. Alvarez, who said, "Most people seem unaware that if [highly enriched uranium] is at hand, it's a trivial job to set off a nuclear explosion . . . even a high school kid could make a bomb in short order."

Maerli and other speakers said there is a shocking lack of control at nuclear facilities in numerous countries, especially Russia, to prevent the pilfering and sale of highly enriched uranium and plutonium that can be used in bomb-making.

The Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency, which organized today's conference, reports 175 cases of trafficking in nuclear material since 1993, including 18 cases that involved small amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium. What is unknown is whether these numbers represent the extent or just the tip of the problem.

In these cases, the material was seized by law enforcement agencies, but records at the facilities, most of them Russian, from which the uranium or plutonium was stolen showed that nothing was missing, officials said.

"The controls on nuclear material and radioactive sources are uneven," said Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the agency. "Security is as good as its weakest link and loose nuclear material in any country is a potential threat to the entire world."

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the United States has spent billions of dollars on anti-proliferation programs, including some to dismantle the nuclear arsenals of such former Soviet republics as Ukraine, employing former Soviet nuclear scientists and beefing up security at their old facilities. But up to 60 percent of nuclear material in Russia remains inadequately secured, according to Matthew Bunn, assistant director of the science, technology and public policy program at Harvard University's Kennedy School.

"This is a threat that we know how to fix and it's a matter of writing checks," said Bunn, who criticized the Bush administration for cutting funding for such nuclear programs in Russia after it came to office. "I think it's shocking. There has been a complete lack of leadership."

In a letter to the conference, President Bush said, "We will look to the IAEA to continue serving as a critical instrument to help combat the real and growing threat of nuclear proliferation."

Today's meeting was intended to drive home the urgency of action and increase the profile of a U.N. agency whose funding has been low for years.

The agency wants between $30 million and $50 million to step up its safety work; securing nuclear material worldwide could cost up to $30 billion, according to one study in the United States.

Before Sept. 11, the IAEA was primarily concerned about the risk of states believed to sponsor terrorist acts "diverting nuclear materials into clandestine weapons programs," said ElBaradei. Sept. 11 has expanded the dimensions of the threat -- the conference heard that some religious extremists would likely use a weapon of mass destruction, whether nuclear, chemical or biological, if they could get one.

"From a psychological point of view, the thresholds have already been crossed," said Jerrold M. Post, professor of psychiatry, political psychology and international affairs at George Washington University and a CIA veteran. "There is no reason to think the choice of weapon would be a constraint."

The agency was also warned that terrorists may seek to kill scores and cause widespread panic by dusting a conventional bomb with radioactive material widely in use in civilian life, and that nuclear power plants are not prepared for the kind of multipronged attack employed by the terrorists on Sept. 11.

"Suppose that these 19 [hijackers] had formed into teams to drive four vans with large high-explosive bombs into the power reactors and spent fuel ponds for a large nuclear facility," said George Bunn, a professor at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation. "Does any civilian facility's design . . . suggest protection against such threats?"

The answer, Bunn said, is no.

ElBaradei pleaded for international unity to create universal minimum security standards for nuclear plants and material, standards that are now largely left to individual countries.

Such efforts have failed in the past, with poor countries saying they cannot afford them and richer countries, including France, Germany and Britain, saying a new system of international oversight infringes on their sovereignty. The United States, at various times, has supported and then rejected new requirements for the protection of nuclear plants.

Those sentiments are changing, U.S. and European officials here said, but any new protocol is still years away, given the pace at which international agreements are reached and ratified.

-------- india / pakistan

India's Cabinet Approves Power Plant

The Associated Press
Saturday, Nov. 3, 2001; 9:36 p.m. EST
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/aponline/20011103/aponline213631_000.htm

NEW DELHI, India -- India's Cabinet gave its approval Saturday for the construction of a nuclear power plant with technical and financial assistance from Russia, the government said.

The two countries will sign an agreement on the 2,000-megawatt plant during Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to Moscow, which begins Sunday, the government said in a statement.

Construction is to start in May on the plant in Kudankulam, in the southern state of Tamil Nadu. The first of two 1,000-megawatt light-water reactors is to be completed by 2007 and the second by 2008.

The project will "open a new window for the country in the high technology area" and will boost scientific cooperation with Russia, the government said.

The Cabinet has approved $1.4 billion in budget money for the plant the statement said. It said the remainder of the cost would come in a credit from Russia, but it did not say how much more was needed.

----

Pakistan Scientists Questioned Again

By Munir Ahmad
Associated Press Writer
Saturday, Nov. 3, 2001; 2:25 p.m. EST
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/aponline/20011103/aponline142525_001.htm

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan -- Authorities have released two Pakistani nuclear scientists who were detained Oct. 23 for questioning about their links with Afghanistan's ruling Taliban movement.

But a presidential spokesman said Sultan Bashir-ud-Din Mehmood and Abdul Majid were again called in for questioning Saturday. Majid was later released and Mehmood was expected to go home soon, Maj. Gen. Rashid Quereshi said.

Earlier this week, the two scientists were allowed to go home, but relatives said their movements were restricted.

Quereshi said the scientists were not involved in any weapons programs and that they were questioned about aid projects they run in Afghanistan.

Mehmood, who played a key role in developing Pakistan's nuclear program, is head of a private organization that is trying to help rehabilitate Afghanistan and stimulate its economy.

Mehmood's aid organization, Tameer-e-Ummah, had operated inside Afghanistan with the backing of Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar.

A spokesman for the organization said five members remain in custody.

The international community is concerned about the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons because of fears that some elements in the military remain sympathetic to the Taliban, which is under daily attack from U.S. air power.

President Gen. Pervez Musharraf has repeatedly insisted that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is safe, and officials have said they did not suspect any nuclear information has been leaked to the Taliban.

Mehmood, who left the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission in 1998, was hospitalized a few days ago after complaining of chest pains during interrogation, his family said.

Also Saturday, the government of North West Frontier province, a region with close links to Afghanistan, barred two dozen Pakistani Muslim clerics from entering its territory for 30 days.

The regulation appeared aimed at curbing pro-Taliban unrest along the remote border among Pashtuns, the same ethnic group as most Taliban. Demonstrators have blocked roads and some have crossed into Afghanistan to join forces with the Taliban.

-------- israel

Film shows French role in developing weapons

Saturday, November 3, 2001
By STEVE WEIZMAN
The Associated Press
http://www.bergen.com/morenews/bomb03200111038.htm

JERUSALEM -- Israel has made no secret of the fact that it has a nuclear reactor, which it says it uses for peaceful purposes. But a new television documentary says Israel developed nuclear weapons from French technology acquired in the late 1950s.

While no Israeli official will confirm or deny such reports, the film has not been stopped by Israel's military censor.

It shows a former French Defense Ministry official saying that the head of the French Atomic Energy Commission, Francis Perrin, advised then-Prime Minister Guy Mollet to give Israel a nuclear bomb.

"Francis Perrin called Guy Mollet," says the official, Abel Thomas. "He told him that Israel should be supplied with a nuclear bomb."

Neither Mollet nor Perrin is alive. Thomas was the chief of political staff for Maurice Bourges-Mounory, France's defense minister at the time.

He said the offer came after Moscow threatened nuclear strikes against France, Israel, and Britain for having sent troops into the Sinai peninsula. The deployment came after Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, which had been owned by British and French businesses.

At the time, France was appreciative of Israel's defense of the French Suez businesses and also sympathetic to the threats facing the Jewish state, following France's own occupation in World War II, the documentary says.

The documentary is to be broadcast in Israel on Sunday. It says France supplied a nuclear reactor and scientists and technicians to set it up in Israel. The French agreed to supply enriched uranium, the documentary says, and cites foreign reports as saying France also supplied a plant for producing plutonium.

Further quoting foreign sources, the documentary says France also sold Israel Mirage jets that had been adapted to carry a nuclear payload.

A French Defense Ministry spokesman in Paris said Friday that he knew nothing about the allegations. He said there would be no comment until ministry officials had seen the documentary.

The film, "A Bomb in the Basement -- Israel's Nuclear Option," marks the first time Israel's nuclear armory has been covered in depth by the Israeli media, which is subject to military censorship, said creator Michael Karpin.

Israel describes its policy as one of "nuclear ambiguity," where it will neither confirm nor deny its nuclear capability but pledges not to be the first in the region to use nuclear weapons.

It says its nuclear plant, at Dimona in the Negev Desert, is for peaceful research and industry.

In the film, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, then deputy defense minister, acknowledges asking "for a nuclear reactor and other things" in his negotiations with the French. But he does not specifically confirm or deny Israel's possession of nuclear weapons.

Mordechai Vanunu, a former technician at Dimona, is serving 18 years in an Israeli prison for giving pictures taken inside the reactor to The Sunday Times of London in 1986.

Based on the photographs, experts concluded Israel had the world's sixth-largest stockpile of nuclear weapons. The CIA estimated more recently that Israel has between 200 and 400 nuclear weapons.

In the documentary, the late Paul C. Warnke, the chief U.S. arms control negotiator at the time, said Washington was opposed to Israel having a nuclear capability because of fears it would force its Arab neighbors to seek one too.

Warnke, who died Wednesday, said that after pressuring Israel, U.S. inspectors were allowed into parts of the Dimona plant but were unable to get a full picture of its activities.

-------- u.s. nuc facilities

Are Nuclear Plants Secure?
Industry Called Unprepared for Sept. 11-Style Attack

By Michael Grunwald and Peter Behr
Washington Post Staff Writers
Saturday, November 3, 2001; Page A01
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A32790-2001Nov2?language=printer

On the day after the terrorist attacks on America, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission happened to file a legal brief about terrorist attacks on nuclear facilities. A group called Georgians Against Nuclear Energy (GANE) had lodged a complaint because no one had even analyzed the risk of a "malevolent act" at a proposed plutonium plant on the Savannah River.

No, it hadn't, the commission responded. "Federal agencies need only address reasonably foreseeable environmental impacts," the NRC brief stated. "GANE does not establish that terrorist acts . . . fall within the realm of 'reasonably foreseeable' events."

It was an untimely argument to make on Sept. 12, 2001. But that was the argument nuclear regulators had been making for decades. Now, federal and state officials are scrambling to ramp up security at nuclear power plants nationwide, banning planes from their airspace and dispatching National Guard troops and Coast Guard boats to their perimeters, hoping to prevent terrorists from creating a Chernobyl-style catastrophe in the United States. They concede that Sept. 11 has caused a sea change in their attitudes about "reasonably foreseeable" threats, and NRC Chairman Richard A. Meserve has ordered a "top-to-bottom" review of security rules.

"The events of September 11 were a wake-up call," Meserve said in an interview yesterday.

"Everything's on the table," added NRC spokesman Victor Dricks. "I'd like to tell you that everything's going to be okay, but I can't do that."

For critics of the nuclear industry and its regulators, the first multibillion-dollar question is whether an era of complacency is truly over. The second is how the vulnerabilities of the nation's 103 operating nuclear plants -- and several defunct plants still saddled with potentially lethal stockpiles of nuclear waste -- can be reduced now and in the future. These questions are not purely academic: Investigators say Islamic militant Ramzi Yousef, the convicted mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, has encouraged followers to attack a nuclear power plant.

The NRC has acknowledged that U.S. nuclear plants were not designed to withstand the impact of a Boeing 767 jetliner. But the risks go much deeper than that.

Until now, the plants were never required to defend against attacks by air or water. They were tested solely on their ability to stop a land assault by a few mock intruders with automatic weapons, explosives and perhaps a sport-utility vehicle, with limited assistance from at most one insider. And even though the plants are always warned about the NRC tests in advance, 47 percent have revealed "significant weaknesses" in their security forces.

"Significant here means that a real attack would have put the nuclear reactor in jeopardy with the potential for core damage and a radiological release, i.e., an American Chernobyl," NRC security specialist David N. Orrick explained in a February 1999 internal report. "This is nothing less than evidence of an abject failure by the nuclear industry to be capable by themselves of protecting against radiological sabotage."

Orrick wrote that report because the commission had just decided to scrap its own security tests. The NRC subsequently reversed itself, but before Sept. 11 it was considering a transition to industry-run self-assessments; it had scaled back its own tests from eight to six a year. It had even suspended imposition of penalties on plants where security deficiencies were revealed. Meserve said his agency has had to make tough choices within a steadily shrinking budget, but critics say it has focused far more on accelerating the licensing process for nuclear utilities than toughening security requirements.

"The mentality has always been that it can't happen here, and that has got to change," said Rep. Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.), who has hectored the NRC about nuclear plant safety for a decade. "These plants were flunking elementary school security exams, and complaining the whole time that the exams were too hard. Well, they need to start passing college level tests. Now."

For now, the NRC has suspended all force-on-force tests; this, officials say, is not the time for mock intruders near radioactive materials.

Since Sept. 11, the commission has also advised all nuclear plants to go on their highest alerts, and "to take specific actions to address threats that were not previously considered credible," Dricks said. The plants have added security agents and physical barriers, while increasing patrols and restricting access. New employees are no longer allowed to start work before their background checks are complete, and employee lists are being cross-checked with FBI terrorist watch lists. Earlier this week, the Federal Aviation Administration banned aircraft from flying within 12 miles of nuclear facilities below 18,000 feet. And Tom Ridge, director of the Office of Homeland Security, urged governors to supplement security at nuclear plants; at least eight have deployed National Guard troops.

Industry officials say that for all the swift changes in recent weeks, nuclear plants have always been among America's "hardest" targets; reactors, for example, are housed in buildings with four-foot-thick reinforced concrete walls. They say that whenever NRC security tests have identified security weaknesses, they have moved quickly to fix the problems. So they believe terrorists are far more likely to choose "softer" targets with less security.

"We can't guarantee we're impervious to anything that might come," said Steve Kerekes, a spokesman for the Nuclear Energy Institute. "But our reactors are as well protected as anything you're going to find."

But many industry critics believe reactors are not the most worrisome nuclear targets. They fret about an attack on less fortified stockpiles of irradiated nuclear fuel that has been removed from reactors. There are about 40,000 tons of this spent fuel stored at operating and shut-down plants around the country, usually in concrete-reinforced cooling pools that were supposed to be temporary but now hold more radioactive material than the reactors themselves. Most of the spent-fuel pools are housed in fairly standard concrete or corrugated buildings; the Union of Concerned Scientists describes them as "Kmarts without neon."

The NRC's security tests have never even contemplated a possible attack on spent fuel. But a 1997 report for the NRC by Brookhaven National Laboratory concluded that a severe release from a pool could cause as many as 28,000 cancer fatalities and $59 billion in damage, rendering about 188 square miles of land unfit for habitation. And while it is generally true that "older is colder" -- the potency of spent fuel declines somewhat with time -- a 2000 NRC study found that even much older fuel could catch fire, with similar consequences. Finally, a study conducted in 2000 by the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements warned that the consequences of a spent-fuel release dispersed by a bomb could be far worse.

One top NRC official is so worried about spent fuel that he recently asked Edwin Lyman, scientific director of the Nuclear Control Institute, if he could stop talking so much about the subject in public. The NRC did not object to the subjects covered in this article.

The fear is that an explosion, fire or crash that drained or boiled a spent-fuel pool or destroyed its cooling system could create a massive release of radioactive cesium. But industry officials say the critics are trying to create needless hysteria. Kerekes argues that even a spent-fuel fire would not necessarily mean disaster: A plant would likely have "several hours" to put it out or start an alternative cooling system.

Even the worst-case scenarios are in dispute. The reactor explosion at Chernobyl in 1986, for example, caused 31 immediate deaths, and 1,800 children subsequently developed thyroid cancer, according to a United Nations report. But while some nuclear critics predict 20,000 additional cancer cases, John Boice, a Vanderbilt University professor who participated in the U.N. study, said that estimate is far too high. "We aren't seeing excess cases of leukemia" around Chernobyl, Boice said. That would be the first indicator of a wider impact.

Still, there is little doubt that a successful terrorist attack on a nuclear plant -- even a decommissioned facility -- could have a disastrous outcome. That was why Stanley Lane, a town selectman in Westport, Maine, was so disturbed about his Oct. 3 visit to the shuttered Maine Yankee plant.

Lane and his neighbor, a retired chemical company executive named David Bertran, drove unmolested past the plant's old perimeter in Bertran's pickup truck, which had a tarpaulin draped over its flatbed. They finally stopped near an open gate about 100 yards from the plant's buildings, which still contain more than 1,432 spent-fuel assemblies. A private security officer passed them in a van, but didn't stop to ask what they were doing.

"He was probably afraid we were terrorists," Lane joked. "They told us later that we couldn't have driven into the plant, but it's their job to make us feel comfy and calm."

Maine Yankee has blocked off its access roads. It is also preparing to move its spent fuel into "dry cask" storage, outdoor concrete casks that are considered more protective than the pools, and are now in use at about 20 plants. But those are temporary solutions, too. Years ago, the federal government promised to take permanent custody of all spent fuel, but the politics of nuclear waste have kept the promise unfulfilled. An underground repository proposed for Yucca Mountain, Nev., might become reality someday, but not for many years.

And so the focus today is on short-term safety. Nuclear plants may be required to protect themselves against a larger team of suicidal terrorists with heavier artillery and more inside help. Force-on-force tests may be extended to spent-fuel pools, perhaps even at shut-down reactors. There is talk of stockpiling anti-radiation tablets in areas downwind of nuclear plants; France has even installed antiaircraft weaponry near its largest plant.

In 1985, the average U.S. nuclear plant had more than five safety shutdowns a year. By 2000, that figure had been cut 90 percent. The question is whether those safety improvements can be replicated in the area of security.

"This is scary stuff," said Robert Alvarez, a former adviser to former energy secretary Bill Richardson. "We saw what they did on September 11. Nobody wants to think about what they could do at a nuclear facility."

-------- washington

Modifications proposed to Tri-Party Agreement

Hanford News
Sat, Nov 3, 2001
By John Stang Herald staff writer
http://www.hanfordnews.com/2001/1103.html

An attempt will be made to mesh the terms of the Tri-Party Agreement with a future Hanford contract to accelerate cleanup along the Columbia River.

Department of Energy and Environmental Protection Agency officials briefed the Hanford Advisory Board late this week on the upcoming talks.

The Tri-Party Agreement is the legal pact that governs Hanford's cleanup goals and timetables. The EPA, DOE and the state routinely modify it to reflect changing conditions at Hanford.

Meanwhile, DOE wants to award a long-term contract next year to speed up cleanup along Hanford's Columbia River shore so most of it is done by 2012.

DOE expects to issue a detailed final request for proposals by Jan. 23, and to award the contract three to six months later.

Right now, the Tri-Party Agreement's river shore goals and timetables are different from what DOE wants to accomplish with the proposed accelerated cleanup.

Consequently, the state, EPA and DOE will negotiate modifications to the Tri-Party Agreement and the draft river shore proposals so they mesh by April 30.

These new negotiations will cover decontaminating and demolishing the complexes around D, DR, F, H, KE, KW and N reactors plus the sealing of the reactors' cores' chambers.

Also, the talks will cover the removing contaminated soil along the Columbia River's shore plus the cleanup and demolition of numerous contaminated buildings in the 300 Area.

And the negotiations will address how studies will be conducted on the highly radioactive 618-10 and 618-11 waste burial grounds in southeastern Hanford. There has been little study and no environmental fix-it work mapped out on these two sites. Site 618-11 is leaking a narrow but highly radioactive plume of tritium toward Energy Northwest's complex and the Columbia River. The tentative cleanup deadline on these two sites is 2018.

This new river shore contract will replace Bechtel Hanford's current contract, which will expire July 31.

Bechtel is eligible to bid on the new contract. DOE is seeking as many bidders as possible on the new project.

-------- us nuc politics

US, Russia Make Progress on Security

By Judith Ingram
Associated Press Writer
Saturday, Nov. 3, 2001; 3:02 p.m. EST
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/aponline/20011103/aponline150249_000.htm

MOSCOW -- Top U.S. and Russian defense officials indicated progress Saturday in one area of their talks on arms control - weapons reductions - but signaled no breakthrough on U.S. plans to build a new missile shield.

With 10 days to go before a key U.S.-Russian presidential summit, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld met in Moscow with his counterpart Sergei Ivanov and also conferred with President Vladimir Putin.

Although a deal on the missile issue appears unlikely, the two ministers stressed the points they have in common and tried to gloss over lingering differences.

"Neither Russia nor the United States wants to put too much emphasis on the contradictions between them, and are trying to work where there is agreement," Ivanov told reporters in the Kremlin.

The two countries have grown closer since the Sept. 11 terror attacks, improving the likelihood of at least some success at the Nov. 13-15 summit, to be held in Washington and at Bush's ranch in Crawford, Tex.

U.S. officials have suggested good chances for a deal on arms reduction. But the two sides appear to remain far apart on the other major issue: the U.S. desire to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

"The United States wants to move beyond the ABM treaty and establish a new framework for the 21st century," Rumsfeld said. "We had good discussions as to how we go about doing that."

Russia opposes the U.S. missile shield plans as a threat to strategic stability. The 1972 treaty bans nationwide missile defenses on the premise that neither country would strike first without risking retaliation - the principle of mutual assured destruction that was a foundation of Cold War strategy.

However, Russian officials recently have softened their statements, suggesting new flexibility.

"Russia and the United States both understand that we should look into the future together," Ivanov said.

While Russia recognizes the United States' right to drop out of the agreement, he said, "we believe it is better to do so when something new is already in place."

He also indicated the two sides spent a good portion of their discussions on strategic weapons cuts, including provisions for "an absolutely clear and transparent verification regime."

"Today's talks with Putin and Rumsfeld showed we have ... good prospects here to move forward quickly," Ivanov said.

Neither he nor Rumsfeld offered any specifics. However, a senior White House official told The Associated Press earlier that an agreement providing arms cuts of about two-thirds of the arsenal was on the negotiating table, with each country limiting itself to no more than 1,750 to 2,250 warheads.

Rumsfeld expressed U.S. gratitude for Russia's "fine cooperation" in the anti-terrorism campaign following the Sept. 11 attacks. Ivanov said that he and Rumsfeld had discussed additional, "concrete forms of assistance."

"As for improvement in cooperation, we have certain resources here that we can use ... but since they relate to our special services you will understand that I cannot tell you more about that," Ivanov said.

Russia has opened its airspace for humanitarian flights, shared intelligence and worked its diplomatic channels to advance the anti-terrorism campaign.

The Kremlin also has not stood in the way of former Soviet republics that wish to cooperate in the U.S. military operation in Afghanistan.

Later Saturday, Rumsfeld traveled to Tajikistan, where he met President Emomali Rakhmonov and senior officials. He then flew to Uzbekistan, which has provided a base for an estimated 1,000 U.S. soldiers. There have been Russian media reports that Washington wants to persuade Uzbekistan to provide more bases.

Tajikistan, which borders Afghanistan, backs the U.S. operation but the impoverished republic has so far been reluctant to play host to U.S. troops.


-------- MILITARY

-------- afghanistan

Taliban Had OKed Bin Laden Handover

The Associated Press
Saturday, Nov. 3, 2001; 7:12 p.m. EST
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/aponline/20011103/aponline191203_000.htm

CAIRO, Egypt -- The leader of Afghanistan's ruling Taliban militia agreed to extradite Osama bin Laden to Saudi Arabia in 1998 but reneged following U.S. strikes on Afghanistan that year, a former head of Saudi intelligence said Saturday.

Prince Turki al-Faisal, who left his post a few days before Sept. 11, also said he is convinced bin Laden and his al-Qaida network were behind the attacks that destroyed the World Trade Center and damaged the Pentagon.

He said he discussed bin Laden's handover with Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar in a meeting in Kandahar, Afghanistan, two months before the August 1998 terrorist attacks on two U.S. embassies in Africa.

"I briefed him on what (bin Laden) had done against the kingdom's interests and asked him to stop him and hand him over to us," the Saudi royal family member said in an interview with the Saudi-owned satellite TV channel MBC.

Bin Laden - named by the United States as the chief suspect in the Sept. 11 attacks - was then wanted in his native Saudi Arabia for anti-government agitation and opposition to the presence of U.S. troops.

Prince Turki said Omar's response to the extradition request was favorable.

"First he agreed, but he said: 'Let us set up a joint (Saudi-Afghan) committee to probe the ways and means to do that,'" Prince Turki said.

Then the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were blown up by truck bombs, killing 231 people, including 12 Americans. Blaming bin Laden, the United States fired cruise missiles at a bin Laden camp in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan thought to be linked to the Saudi exile.

Prince Turki said that when he returned to Afghanistan later that year, he found Mullah Omar had changed his mind. In a stormy meeting, Mullah Omar flatly rejected the request to extradite bin Laden, he said.

"I told him: 'You will regret it and the Afghan people will pay a high price for that,'" Prince Turki said.

In his first television interview since he left his post as intelligence chief in September, Prince Turki said Mullah Omar and bin Laden share the same ideology.

"At any rate, the evil in them is the same," said Prince Turki, the first prominent Saudi to say publicly that he is convinced bin Laden was behind the Sept. 11 attacks.

Saudi officials are balancing their alliance with Washington and their own fear of Islamic militancy with their citizens' anger at the United States and admiration for bin Laden.

A son of the late King Faisal, Prince Turki served as head of the kingdom's secret service for more than twenty years.

He was reportedly the official who supervised Saudi financial assistance to guerrillas fighting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan of 1979-89. He is also thought to have been a friend of bin Laden before bin Laden joined the guerrillas.

----

Interview with former Soviet Air Force commander in Afghanistan

November 3, 2001
Washington Times
http://www.washingtontimes.com/world/20011103-33926229.htm

Retired Russian Col. Gen. Viktor Kot, 61, former commander of the Soviet air force who served two tours in Afghanistan from 1981-1982 and 1985-1987, was recently interviewed by special correspondent Yuri Karash for The Washington Times.

Gen. Kot, who made about 700 flights in MiG-21 fighter-bombers over the war zone - of which 467 were combat sorties - was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union, the Soviet state's highest award, in 1982. He retired last year as first deputy chief of staff of the Russian air force, and currently works as a senior adviser to the governor of the Moscow region.

Question: How effective are pinpoint strikes in the conditions of Afghanistan?

Answer: Pinpoint strikes are always effective when they are directed against meaningful targets. However, there are very few such targets in Afghanistan.

Of all the Afghan cities, only Kabul has administrative buildings where some of the Taliban leadership could be located. As for so-called "terrorist bases" in the common sense of this word, they do not exist in the territory of Afghanistan. There are small, highly mobile groups of a few dozen people each. Destroying them will be extremely difficult. We [the Soviets] used a lot of "smart weapons," including rockets, laser-guided bombs and heat-seeking missiles, but were never certain that we really hit anybody.

Q: What would be the major challenges for U.S. ground-attack and bomber pilots in Afghanistan?

A: These groups of terrorists are highly successful in using natural [terrain], and they are very good in making false bases designed to mislead air and ground attackers. Afghan fighters have learned a lot about camouflage during the last 20 years of continuous fighting - first against the Soviets and then during the civil war.

Besides, the mujahideen often attack at night and quickly leave the place from where they launched their attack, which makes it really difficult to respond with retaliatory strikes.

So, the first challenge is the absence of open, clearly visible targets.

The second challenge is that in order to determine targets for high-precision weapons, one should have intelligence information obtained not only from radio, electronic, air and space means of reconnaissance, but also from agents located in the territory of Afghanistan.

However, you can never be sure how trustworthy the information you get from local Afghans is about targets. These agents often can't properly find even their own bearings. Sometimes, they also try to deflect air strikes from the ground targets. The Afghan people fight foreign invaders much better and more willingly than each other.

The third challenge is how to make a surprise air strike. Based on my own war experience, I can say that the Taliban definitely have early warning posts located along the borders of Afghanistan. These sentries use all kind of methods - not necessarily electronic but also rudimentary sound and light alarms - to warn the Taliban fighters of approaching aircraft. These fighters then quickly disperse, greatly diminishing the effectiveness of an air strike.

As for Talib anti-aircraft defense, I would not regard it seriously. It does not pose any threat to a modern military aircraft. The aircraft may be hit by Taliban anti-aircraft fire only by accident.

Q: How long should the bombing of Afghan territory last? Should it continue after the start of land operations?

A: Definitely, yes. Moreover, the bombing should become heavier after the beginning of such operations, particularly when airfields in Afghan territory become available to U.S. troops. Combat helicopters must be employed as soon as they can operate from the territory of Afghanistan.

Q: What will be the best way for interaction between U.S. ground troops in Afghanistan and air support?

A: Even small groups of U.S. special forces will desperately need very strong air support. This support will literally have to burn the way for them through the Taliban troops. I would advise that each ground unit operating in Afghanistan have an air unit assigned to it, and that the two constantly stay in close touch. This is how they would assure effective coordination of their actions.

Q: Do you believe that the United States did adequate preparation for its military action against the Taliban?

A: In order to be successful in the conditions of Afghanistan, any military action must be a blitzkrieg - otherwise it will turn into a long, bloody, exhausting war for both sides.

Keep in mind that a lot of Afghan people don't really see a big difference between the Northern Alliance and Taliban, but they clearly see it between the locals and the foreigners. The longer the battle lasts, the more Afghans will turn their weapons on the invaders, no matter what goals the latter are seeking in the territory of Afghanistan.

The Americans should not have advertised their military operation against Taliban for so long. From my point of view, it was a mistake to negotiate with the Taliban leadership about the fate of [suspected terrorist mastermind Osama] bin Laden. Both the Taliban and bin Laden took advantage of this period to regroup their forces and prepare their resistance to U.S. invasion, including U.S. air strikes.

Q: What is your major concern regarding anti-terrorist operations in Afghanistan?

A: I have two major concerns. The first one is that the United States will get bogged in the fight with the Taliban and the war against terrorists will become a war against the Afghan people.

My second concern is that the Americans may stop halfway in their battle against the Taliban if the latter surrender bin Laden. If the United States does not finish the Taliban whatever it costs, Taliban leaders and militants will become like a disturbed swarm of bees that will fly out of Afghanistan and create their nests all over the world.

This won't eliminate terrorism but just spread it around the globe.

Q: What advice based on your own combat experience would you give to American pilots?

A: First, be flexible when going on a raid into Afghanistan. Keep in mind that the target you intend to bomb may turn out to be a false one, or will quickly disperse or move to another location before you reach it. Always have backup targets and be prepared to literally chase terrorist gangs.

Second, take maximum care of yourselves during your sorties. Don't think that the outcome of the battle against the Taliban depends on your particular mission. There is no need for taking risks, or especially for any self-sacrifice. Regard your missions as regular training exercises. The destiny of Taliban is already sealed.

----

Pentagon tightens 'noose' on bin Laden

November 3, 2001
By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20011103-733248.htm

The Pentagon said yesterday it is getting closer to catching terrorist leader Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan as harsh weather hampered getting additional U.S. forces on the ground.

"He's an elusive character," said Rear Adm. John Stufflebeem, deputy director for operations on the Joint Staff. "It's going to be a difficult problem, but we're determined to be able to do it."

Last night, a U.S. helicopter on a special forces mission went down due to severe weather in Afghanistan, but there were no U.S. casualties, the Pentagon said.

The crew, four of whom were injured, was rescued by a second helicopter.

The Pentagon said F-14 Tomcats from the carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt destroyed the damaged helicopter, a standard procedure in cases where high-tech items are lost.

Yesterday's crash highlights the difficulties faced by U.S. forces due to the country's harsh climate and rugged terrain in capturing bin Laden, the leader of the al Qaeda terrorist network, who is suspected of masterminding the September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

U.S. officials said intelligence reports have stated that bin Laden is believed to be in hiding in a cave or underground command bunker in central Afghanistan.

Adm. Stufflebeem said the military is confident bin Laden will eventually be attacked but he declined to say when that might take place.

"We are tightening the noose," he said, echoing remarks by President Bush. "We are confident in some of our capabilities to be able to help tighten this noose. And there is, one, a resolute mission to do this, firstly; and secondly, we have the means. It's a matter of time."

Adm. Stufflebeem said it is difficult to know when U.S. forces are close to striking al Qaeda's terrorist leaders.

"I'm sure that there are times when we feel very close and other times it's a shadow," he said. "So it is most accurate that the noose is tightening, the country is getting much smaller."

Harsh weather, including freezing rain in parts of Afghanistan, is hampering the military's efforts to bring in teams of special-operations commandos who are assisting anti-Taliban opposition groups and providing spotters for U.S. bombing strikes.

"I think within the last 24 hours, it would be fair to report that weather has been hampering our efforts," he said. "But we won't stop."

Intelligence reports from Afghanistan also indicate that there are clashes between opposition forces and those of the ruling Taliban militia, and that the U.S. military is working to set up supply routes to southern opposition groups.

"We are working to be able to establish the relationships with those tribes who are opposing the Taliban," said Adm. Stufflebeem.

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said on Thursday that the Pentagon has hesitated to provide arms and equipment to some opposition groups because of their uncertain allegiances and the possibility that they might not use the goods, but instead sell them to the Taliban.

Asked about U.S. coordination with opposition groups, Adm. Stufflebeem said the military is trying to get with them "and build trust."

"And once you see how they operate, you then know whom you can trust and who you probably should not," he said.

Adm. Stufflebeem described many of the opposition groups as "survivalists."

"And in that vein, they may change allegiances at a tactical moment for whatever it is that they need or want to do," he said.

"So we're going to make sure that with our forces who are embedded, that they'll be able to know whom it is we can and can't trust, and make sure we get the right equipment and right stuff to the right people."

U.S. officials have said the ethnic Tajik group headed by Afghan commander Ismail Khan has asked for U.S. arms and assistance for his forces in northeastern Afghanistan.

The Hazara tribe located in the central mountains has also asked for U.S. aid to fight the Taliban, said the officials.

Taliban spies also appear to be alerting its forces to approaching U.S. aircraft with tactical radios, said Adm. Stufflebeem. The advance word allows the Taliban troops to "take cover, and use caves, as well," he said.

Adm. Stufflebeem said the Pentagon is deploying a long-range unmanned aerial vehicle known as Global Hawk to the region, but he declined to say what kind of mission the surveillance drone would undertake.

Also, the JSTARS aircraft has been dispatched. The four-engine aircraft is capable of tracking hundreds of targets on the ground, such as vehicles and directing forces to attack them.

"That will be helpful when you're looking for trucks or SUVs or others that are moving around," he said.

The CIA currently is operating an experimental version of a Predator unmanned aerial vehicle that is equipped with air-launched missiles.

Regarding clashes between Northern Alliance forces and the Taliban, Adm. Stufflebeem said the Taliban is having "extreme trouble" with resupplying its forces near the strategic town of Mazar-e-Sharif.

"The Northern Alliance objective is to take the Mazar-e-Sharif airport and to take the city," he said. "They're doing that in a number of actions over a course of a number of groups. So it's a very fluid environment on the ground there."

Asked about the prospects of a Northern Alliance offensive, Adm. Stufflebeem said: "I do believe they can pull it off. I, personally, can't characterize how soon it would be."

----

Special forces vet sees U.S. - Soviet parallels

November 3, 2001
By Timothy Gusinov
SPECIAL TO THE WASHINGTON TIMES
http://www.washingtontimes.com/world/20011103-4481265.htm

When I read in the newspapers that U.S. special forces units are on the ground in Afghanistan, I can't help but have this deja-vu feeling of "been there, done that."

And it all comes back to me: Dark nights in the mountains of the Hindu Kush, the angry roar of helicopter engines in thin air, deafening bursts of automatic fire and hand-grenade explosions in narrow canyons and among packed mud walls of Afghan villages, the exhausting dash back toward the pickup area - Soviet Spetsnaz (special forces) at war in Afghanistan.

As if through the mist of time, I see the faces of my comrades, dead and alive ... Maybe their experience will help those who now have to defend the United States in the fight against terrorism in that obscure part of the world.

The involvement of Spetsnaz in Afghanistan began in 1980, soon after the deployment of Soviet army troops there. The Soviet command quickly realized that mechanized infantry units are not so effective against the guerrilla tactics used by mujahideen.

The Spetsnaz were called in as the only unit capable of fighting the enemy on his own terms. Surprisingly, even these crack units initially lacked mountain-warfare training. In the event of an all-out war, their mission was to hunt and destroy NATO's headquarters, command and communications centers and mobile missiles launchers in the European theater.

In Afghanistan, they had to learn a lot, and learn it fast, to meet new challenges.

Through the years of the Soviet Afghan war, Spetsnaz forces developed effective tactics for helicopter assaults, ambushes, mine warfare, and for destroying enemy supply convoys or depots.

Helicopter tactics

It may help to keep the following in mind: Helicopters deployed for landing a special forces team in enemy territory should make several landings, but leave the team at only one location - and only at night, of course. This will complicate search and pursuit by the enemy: Instead of one place, they will have to search several places, which in turn will disperse their forces.

The helicopters must drop the unit two to three miles beyond their target, so that instead of going deeper into enemy territory for the attack, the group will be moving toward its own base. If the enemy undertakes a search, it is more likely to look in front of the asset than behind it.

Returning to base after inserting the team, the helicopter must use a different route.

To conceal the deployment of a special forces team, create other air force activity in the area, including limited air strikes, but not too close to the team's objective.

Hitting enemy convoys

During the years of the Soviet Afghan war, the mujahideen developed effective ways to bring arms and ammunition-supply convoys into Afghanistan. There is no doubt that under complete American air domination, these tactics will be employed again by the Taliban.

The methods most used by Spetsnaz to destroy such convoys were helicopter assaults and ambushes en route. If there was intelligence about a big weapons and ammunition convoy leaving Pakistan for Afghanistan, Spetsnaz sometimes used helicopter raids - especially in Baluchistan, inside Pakistan, which has considerably flat terrain.

Hiding behind hills and along dry river beds, the helicopters would fly nine to 12 miles into Pakistan and then turn back toward Afghanistan, following the favored convoy routes. The mujahideen felt quite safe and comfortable on Pakistani territory, traveled in daylight and would usually take the helicopters for Pakistani aircraft. The next moment the choppers would open fire and occasionally even land a Spetsnaz team to finish the work and take trophies.

Timing was the key. The whole operation would take 20 to 30 minutes, and Pakistani air defense usually did not have time to react.

The general rule for intercepting and destroying weapons and ammunition convoys is: The closer to the enemy's base or main camp that you intercept them, the higher are the chances that convoy security will not be on full alert, and the convoy will be together. After arrival at a distribution area, the large convoy will be met by representatives of different field commanders and tribes and divided into small units that are harder to find.

Don't concentrate too much on collecting and bringing back trophies: The desire is understandable, but it can kill you. After you have finished your work - destroying a military facility, camp, convoy, etc. - you have very limited time before enemy reinforcements arrive. Also, carrying a lot of trophies will complicate your movement to the pickup area if helicopters can't land close to where you are. Instead, take pictures for reporting results, and if you need it, a body count.

Divide your team in two groups: One should take up positions to provide observation and cover, the other should destroy the captured facility or supplies.

Use explosive materials always found in captured supplies - mines, artillery munitions - to destroy weapons so that you don't have to carry a lot of explosives with you. Do not destroy supplies that are less important but still attractive to the enemy, like food or even small-arms ammunition; instead, booby-trap them.

If you destroy an animal convoy and some animals are alive and still have loads on their backs, booby-trap the animals using a hand-grenade with a half-pulled safety pin as a fuse for one or two extra explosive charges attached to the bags on the animal's back by a short piece of cord or rope.

Learn the locale

Try to use the same special unit for operations in a particular area on a repeat basis. In Afghanistan, where knowledge of the terrain and local features is crucial and maps are often outdated and lack details and recent changes, the use of the permanent team for a permanent area will help. It will give the team members an opportunity to learn the roads and routes used by the enemy and the specific local tactics it employs in the area; it also will help the team members figure out sources of water, best places for ambushes, etc.

Soviet experience shows that using Spetsnaz teams "specializing" in a particular area brings better results, while using a special forces team without much experience in that area increases the chances of casualties.

In addition to helicopter assaults, raids into enemy territory and standard ambush tactics were employed. In many cases, Spetsnaz tried to pass as mujahideen to set up traps and intercept convoys.

As all Soviet military bases were closely monitored by the enemy, Spetsnaz used the following tactics to slip out of their locations undetected: Trophy vehicles (make sure not to use a vehicle captured in the same area), usually favored by mujahideen, like four-wheel drive Toyota and Iranian-made Simurg pickup trucks, were loaded into large vehicles with tarpaulin covers such as Soviet-made KRAZ and ZIL trucks. Spetsnaz personnel, clad in local garb, would also hide inside.

A convoy of three to four such vehicles accompanied by two to three armored vehicles would leave the base and move to an outside post or another military unit located nearby without attracting much attention, not like a large number of armored vehicles leaving the base.

On the way, the trucks would stop at a place offering limited observation such as a dry gully or a ruined village. Using thick planks, pickup trucks would be unloaded from the transport vehicles and taken to their destination, while the rest of the convoy would drive on and return to their base later.

Even if you speak the local language and dress like natives, don't count too much on passing as a local: Even the way you walk is different, there are too many tribal dialects and dress-specific features - the manner of donning a head dress for instance, or the manner of carrying weapons and the like.

Still, depending on the mission, it can make sense to dress like locals if you dress correctly for that part of the country. It may fool the enemy for a while, giving you the privilege of the first shot.

After the Persian Gulf war, I remember reading an article about a U.S. Special Forces team operating in Iraq. The team members were detected by a shepherd boy, but they could not "neutralize" him. Of course, the boy informed the Iraqi troops, and the U.S. team was captured.

Well, very pathetic, but not professional. By sparing the boy, the team leader jeopardized not only his own life but also those of other team members as well as the mission. They were hunting Scud-missile launchers. How many American troops could be killed by one undetected Scud missile?

And Afghanistan is less forgiving of such errors than Iraq. Of course, every captured American soldier will be an asset for the Taliban, but the militia's command structure is very decentralized, and field commanders are the final decision makers. Most of them have never heard of international treaties on the treatment of POWs. For them, you are just infidels invading their land.

Thus, with due respect to the feelings of special forces personnel, it must be said that while operating on enemy territory, it doesn't matter who detects you - a child, a shepherd, a woman, an old man - the first thing they will do is report you to the enemy. This has to be kept in mind, and an appropriate decision must be taken.

One last tip: In enemy territory, hide your used toilet paper. Most rural Afghans use small stones and pieces of dry clay for this purpose.

Remember: The success of your mission will determine the future of this battered land and the future of its people, and will stop the spread of terrorism in the world. It is an honorable mission.

•Timothy Gusinov served two tours of duty in Afghanistan, nine years in all, with Russian military advisers, Soviet troops and Spetsnaz units. He speaks Farsi and Dari. He was wounded twice, awarded a number of medals including the Order of the Red Star and promoted to the rank of major at the age of 28. He currently lives in the United States.

-------- biological weapons

Germ Weapons Plant Is Dismantled

By Alima Bissenova
Associated Press Writer
Thursday, November 1, 2001; 2:02 PM
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A24694-2001Nov1?language=printer

STEPNOGORSK, Kazakstan -- Biological weapons engineers who worked to create the world's biggest anthrax-manufacturing plant are now laboring to dismantle it - and wondering whether they'll find jobs again.

The scrapping of the germ warfare plant at the Stepnogorsk Scientific Experimental and Production Base is being carried out under the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. But scientists at the Soviet-era plant say another promised part of the U.S.-funded program - conversion of the plant to civilian use - seems to have been shelved.

"There have been no investments, no arrangements for long-term civilian production," said Yuri Rufov, director of Biomedpreparat, the main successor.

"We are fulfilling our obligations in liquidating all the equipment that could be used for germ weapons production," he said. "Now it is time for the United States to give us real support in developing a peaceful biotechnology industry here."

A former director of the Stepnogorsk plant, Vladimir Bugreyev, said most of the scientists left for Russia in 1992-93. As far as he knows, none have gone elsewhere.

Western officials have long expressed concern that Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya, which are all believed to have germ warfare programs, might try to hire some of the scientists.

A decade ago, when the Soviet Union was breaking up and the Cold War was ending, this town on the wind-swept steppes of northern Kazakstan wasn't listed on Soviet maps.

It was located inside a closed military zone where hundreds of scientists labored to develop lethal strains of biological weapons. It had the capacity to produce 330 tons of weapons-grade anthrax over a 10-month period, enough to decimate the population of the United States.

The facility's underground bunkers could hold up to 550 tons of anthrax powder, as well as equipment for loading the germs into bombs and missile warheads.

The plant was built starting in 1982 to replace a Soviet factory in the Ural Mountains' city of Sverdlovsk, now Yekaterinburg, that accidentally released anthrax into the air in 1979, killing about 70 people. Boris Yeltsin, then the local Communist Party boss, has said he did not know about the germ warfare facility at the time.

The Stepnogorsk plant violated the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention, which the Soviet Union signed in 1972. It wasn't until 1992 that Yeltsin, by then Russia's president, acknowledged the violation.

Russia cut off funding for biological weapons in 1991-92. A year later, the Stepnogorsk plant was reorganized for civilian use and renamed Biomedpreparat.

About 500 bioweapons engineers worked here in 1990; today, just 152 employees work in two civilian laboratories spun out of the Stepnogorsk weapons plant. Many are mechanics and technicians who are dismantling the equipment.

"There is nothing here, nothing left and nothing going on," director Rufov said. "Everything is in the past."

A U.S.-funded, $5.8 million joint venture to manufacture vitamins, antibiotics and other pharmaceutical projects never got off the ground, and equipment sent to Stepnogorsk has been mothballed.

"The equipment is worn out and outdated and didn't come with any supporting technical maintenance documentation," Rufov said bitterly.

U.S. officials say they are committed to developing the commercial potential at Stepnogorsk, but point to barriers to foreign investment. The site is remote - 100 miles from Kazakstan's new capital Astana. Buildings are in poor condition and the plant could be contaminated. A few weeks ago, U.S. inspectors found anthrax spores in a pipe at Stepnogorsk.

The plant was designed inefficiently for military production, so conversion to civilian uses would be costly. Rufov said the plant used a huge amount of energy, making it uncompetitive in the new market economy.

The Kazak government allocated only $500,000 for biotechnology research this year, and several institutes, including another laboratory at Stepnogorsk, the Institute of Pharmaceutical Biotechnology, are vying for the funds, institute director Nadim Mukashev said.

His institute lacks heating because of unpaid utility bills. The 52 employees - many of them former Stepnogorsk bioweapons engineers - often aren't paid for months, Mukashev said.

The town's fate mirrors the plant. More than half the 1990 population of 70,000 has migrated, and entire apartment buildings stand abandoned.

Eighteen former bioweapons engineers now work for the environmental monitoring laboratory, which is responsible for the plant's safe dismantlement by 2004. Laboratory head Yevgeny Kalmykov said the department could expand its work to analyze soil samples in other regions of Kazakstan. U.S. officials say it is the most commercially viable sector of the plant.

"We have the most up-to-date equipment for organic, inorganic and microbiological analysis of environmental samples, as well as highly qualified specialists," Kalmykov said.

-------- u.s.

Marine anti-terrorism unit makes comeback after hits

November 3, 2001 (AP)
http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20011103-81903740.htm

CAMP GEIGER, N.C. - Vigilance with attitude. That's the catch-phrase of the Marine Corps' new anti-terrorism brigade.

In the words of Cpl. Willie Owens, 22, of Selma, Ala.: "Who doesn't have a chip on their shoulder after September 11? Anything that's in our way, we're going to stop."

Cpl. Owens was one of about 60 Marines who ran through a refresher course Thursday on chemical warfare at Camp Geiger, a training base adjacent to Camp Lejeune.

The men were from a 1,000-member battalion that is part of the 4,800-member 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, a dormant anti-terrorism unit reactivated this week in response to the September 11 attacks.

Instead of engaging in counterterrorism operations, such as hunting down terrorists as do special-operations units in other services, the brigade has a defensive role.

Its members will be ready to fight in urban areas if asked by state or federal authorities, and will protect places such as ports or embassies. Besides the standard M-16 rifle, the troops can use shotguns firing nonlethal rubber pellets for crowd control.

"Shotguns in close quarters are a lot more useful than rifles," said Brig. Gen. Douglas O'Dell, the brigade commander. "Just the presence of a shotgun presents a different threat in the eye of the beholder."

Gen. O'Dell said he expects that a third of the brigade's missions will be in the United States and the rest overseas.

The brigade is designed to deploy an assessment team as small as six Marines to a trouble spot within six hours. A platoon or company can leave in 12 hours and the entire brigade could be mobilized within 72 hours.

"These Marines are bad dudes," Gen. O'Dell said. "They're being trained to be badder.

"We're not in the business of killing 14-year-old, rock-throwing boys. We're in the business of killing these evil men who are dressed up in the clothing of terrorism."

The trainees Thursday donned charcoal-lined suits, gas masks and rubber gloves, covered their boots with rubber booties, and entered a chamber that was filled with tear gas.

They loosened their masks until the stinging fumes had every man coughing. Then, following shouted orders, they bolted from the small building into the clear autumn air.

After a short chance to catch their breath and wash off their faces, the men ran a muddy obstacle course through the pine woods as trainers popped yellow and green smoke grenades. Small explosions simulated mortar fire and helicopters roared overhead.

The troops, carrying rubber training rifles, ran to a field where they practiced taking off their protective gear without spreading the irritating gas back onto themselves, and decontaminating it with powdered bleach.

The exercise was meant to remind the Marines, some of whom served in Kosovo, "what it's going to be like if they go into a situation where there is a chemical or biological agent," said Warrant Officer Steven Dancer, one of the trainers.

The Marine Corps announced in September that it would re-establish the brigade. Most of the brigade consists of existing units; the anti-terrorist designation is primarily an organizational change.


-------- OTHER

-------- environment

Delegates shape Kyoto Protocol's future

Japan Times
Saturday, November 3, 2001
By MICK CORLISS Staff writer
The Japan Times: Nov. 3, 2001
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?eo20011103a1.htm

Conventional wisdom has it that the devil is in the details. It is exactly devilish details that are waiting for climate-change negotiators trying to put the finishing touches on the Kyoto climate accord at negotiations in Marrakesh, Morocco that will run until Nov. 9.

Spurred in part by the withdrawal of the United States -- which is responsible for nearly a quarter of the world's man-made greenhouse gases emissions -- from the Kyoto Protocol in March, signatories to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change mustered the political resolve to agree on the core issues of the Kyoto pact at the sixth session of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention, or COP6, in July in Bonn.

After the breakdown of negotiations last November in The Hague, this meeting of minds came as a surprise to many.

At COP7 in Marrakesh, delegates from around 175 nations are going to try to put the frosting on the Kyoto Protocol cake.

After eight days of hashing out the specifics, high-ranking officials will convene over the final three days to give the nod to and, hopefully, adopt a finalized legal text on the operational details of the protocol.

Ideally, this will pave the way for countries to ratify the documents in their home legislatures and put the protocol into force by 2002.

United Nations and Japanese government officials both seem sanguine. As articulated by Japan's Environmental Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi last week, their sentiments are that COP7 will proceed more smoothly than COP6 and will conclude successfully.

However, this optimism is tempered by recognition that there is still much haggling to be done and minutiae could still trip up debate.

"What will be difficult in negotiations at this conference will be agreeing on the legal text. There are very detailed areas that require political agreement . . . and could unravel negotiations," Kawaguchi said at a press conference.

Negotiators now need to fill in the blanks of the protocol. The result will essentially be an operating manual for the protocol -- which commits industrialized countries to paring greenhouse gas emissions by over 5 percent by the period 2008 to 2012 -- based on the political principles penned at COP6 in July.

Debate will be highly technical. It will include the so-called Kyoto Mechanisms -- three alternative cost-saving methods for nations to cut greenhouse gas emissions, such as through emission trading and by undertaking projects abroad to offset domestic emissions, as well as eligibility requirements for nations to meet to use them.

Likewise, articles on monitoring, accounting, reporting and verifying emissions need to be thrashed out. These are the foundation of the protocol: Only if these are accurate will real reductions be realized and can the compliance component of the treaty be made to function.

Sticky questions -- such as how much should developing nations, under no obligation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, which can receive carbon emission credits for hosting emission reduction projects participate -- need to be clarified.

Forging consensus on credits from "sinks," carbon-absorbing areas such as forests and agricultural lands, could prove tough going as well. Russia has voiced dissatisfaction with its sink allowances, which could stall talks.

This objection is more than likely in part a response to the preferential treatment granted to Japan that will potentially allow it to achieve a healthy chunk -- nearly two-thirds of its pledged 6 percent cut -- from domestic forestry.

Still another hurdle is coming to terms with how to enforce compliance among foot-dragging countries and how to rehabilitate delinquent countries, putting them back on track to meet future targets.

In Japan, the government has started consideration of a carbon tax and initiated debate on how to use domestic forests to better absorb carbon.

Meanwhile, industry is vehemently opposed to any obligatory emissions reductions, instead preferring to lobby for more time to "debate." Momentum from a success in Marrakesh could help overcome domestic resistance.

If the Kyoto Protocol was born at COP3 in 1997, the negotiations in Morroco could be the document's first tottering steps. Indeed, this is only the beginning of a long road to try to stabilize concentrations of greenhouse gas at safe levels.

The climate pact only sets the tone for the first commitment period, from 2008 to 2012. There will likely be many more to come.

Myriad yardsticks will be applied to determine whether COP7 is a success. But there will be no ready-made answer.

Ultimately, whether the agreement proves detailed and persuasive enough for national legislatures to endorse will be what determines whether the pact can be put into force in time for the September 2002 Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, where the world will assess progress in tackling environmental problems.

To put the accord into force, the backing of European countries, Japan and Russia will be required. For this to be possible, the rules must be clear so that countries know what they are getting into.

It is incumbent upon negotiators to see that the results of the session in Marrakesh make that possibility a reality.

-------- health

Prescribing Cipro Is 'Uncontrolled Experiment'
Health Officials Worry That Taking Drug for Anthrax May Have Serious Side Effects

By Shankar Vedantam
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, November 3, 2001; Page A15
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A32486-2001Nov2.html

Fifteen months ago, spurred by fears that bioterrorists armed with lethal strains of bacteria could launch an attack on the United States and kill millions of people, the federal government took the unusual step of pressuring Bayer Corp. to rush a medicine called Cipro through the approval process for the treatment of anthrax.

The older antibiotics penicillin and doxycycline were known to be effective against the disease, but there were fears that Russian scientists had engineered a strain of anthrax resistant to those drugs. Due to the rarity of the disease, Cipro had never been tested against anthrax in people. But based on its effectiveness against other bacteria and an animal study from 1993, regulators at the Food and Drug Administration designated Cipro the only medicine officially approved for inhalation anthrax.

What regulators could not have known then -- and what has come true in the last three weeks -- is that the bioterrorist scare would unfold so differently from the worst-case scenario they had envisioned. The attack involved a strain of anthrax that was not bioengineered to be impervious to the other drugs, which are safer and cheaper. And the number of people exposed and sickened was far fewer than planners had feared.

But when the public discovered that Cipro was the only approved medicine for inhalational anthrax, demand soared. Little attention was paid to the fact that the current strain of anthrax had not been bioengineered. And the 60-day course was accepted as proven even though no studies had demonstrated that was necessary for the kind of attack that actually occurred.

The disparity between the imagined attack and the real one underscores the difficulty of formulating public health measures against little-known bioweapons, and the very real danger that some cures can cause more harm than the bioweapons themselves. For while the anthrax attack that has unfolded over the last three weeks has so far been much milder than the worst-case scenario, the consequences of over-aggressive treatment may not be mild at all.

The full impact of large numbers of people being put on Cipro by doctors -- and even larger numbers taking the medicine on their own -- will not be known for weeks or months. But already, patients with other illnesses who desperately need Cipro have been deprived of the medicine, and patients around the country taking the drug have begun reporting such side effects as dizziness, headaches, nausea and achy joints. Concerns are mounting that overusing Cipro will spawn the growth of resistant microbes, rendering ineffective a drug considered to be a last resort when no other antibiotics work.

"We have never faced the mass use of an antibiotic for 60 days; there's no precedent for that in medicine," said William Hall, president of the American College of Physicians and the American Society of Internal Medicine.

"We are conducting the world's largest uncontrolled experiment, including all these people and TV personalities," said Stephen Porter, a Tennessee pharmacologist who runs Virtual Drug Development Inc., a company that is trying to make an alternative medicine to Cipro.

The studies that originally established the safety of Cipro involved regimens of seven to 10 days, according to Philip Hanna, an anthrax expert at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor. "When you start giving it for two months, that's a whole level of usage that hasn't been proven to be safe," he said.

Leigh Thompson, a South Carolina physician, took Cipro for 21 days when he came down with an infection in Cambodia that he couldn't diagnose with certainty. He took 500-mg tablets, occasionally twice a day, for 21 days. His Achilles tendon became painfully inflamed -- damage to weight-bearing joints and tendons is a known side effect of Cipro's class of drugs. In clinical trials, the medicine has caused young dogs to become lame.

"I personally wouldn't take it prophylactically unless I knew I had big-time exposure, not if I had walked through a building where someone saw a white powder," said Thompson. About putting people prophylactically on 500-mg tablets of Cipro, twice a day for 60 days, he said, "God, that would be insane."

The 60-day recommendation, which was made at the FDA meeting in July last year, was among the measures designed for a worst-case scenario, where public health officials feared they would confront the specter of tens of thousands of deaths.

Since no one had a good idea how long anthrax spores could incubate within the body before turning lethal -- the last known outbreak occurred in a remote part of Russia in 1979, where people continued to fall sick weeks after billions of anthrax spores leaked from a Soviet bioweapons facility -- regulators suggested the 60-day regimen.

"The question was, if you've inhaled spores, how long will it be before you can be safely off antibiotics?" asked Janet Woodcock, director of the FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research. "People could develop cases weeks away from their exposure. We felt it was important to put out a definite recommendation. . . . That's where the 60-day course came from. It was a conservative recommendation -- it was intended for the worst-case scenario."

People found to have inhaled a lethal amount of spores should be aggressively treated, said Woodcock: "The problem with the public is they think that if they were nearby, they were exposed."

This week, the agency formally approved the use of penicillin and doxycycline against inhalation anthrax.

Much of the worst-case scenario was laid out in a paper that was published in the Journal of the American Medical Association in 1999, authored by a working group of 21 leading government, military and university scientists.

The authors wrote that "between 130,000 and 3 million deaths would follow the aerosolized release of 100 kg of anthrax spores upwind of the Washington, D.C. area -- lethality matching or exceeding that of a hydrogen bomb."

The scientists recommended starting victims on Cipro because of the reports that Russian scientists had engineered a strain of the anthrax bacterium "to resist the tetracycline (doxycycline) and penicillin classes of antibiotics."

At least one scientist questioned the group's recommendation: In 1992, the man who had been the Soviet Union's top bioweapons scientist defected to the United States and brought with him news that the Russians had strains of anthrax resistant to penicillin, doxycycline -- and Cipro. Even if U.S. doctors feared that America would be attacked by a virulent Russian strain, Cipro might not worked any better than penicillin or doxycycline.

If proof was needed that making Cipro-resistant anthrax was possible, scientists said that last year an American lab developed such a strain to find a cure.

"It was considered a pretty big deal to develop antibiotic-resistant strains of anthrax," said Ken Alibek, a former Soviet bioweapons scientist who now runs Hadron Inc., an Alexandria company trying to find cures for anthrax. "We developed resistant strains to penicillin, streptomycin, doxycycline and ciprofloxacin [Cipro] by the late '80s or early '90s."

-------- police / prisoners

An Intelligence Giant in the Making
Anti-Terrorism Law Likely to Bring Domestic Apparatus of Unprecedented Scope

By Jim McGee
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, November 4, 2001; Page A04
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A33340-2001Nov3?language=printer

Molded by wartime politics and passed a week and a half ago in furious haste, the new anti-terrorism bill lays the foundation for a domestic intelligence-gathering system of unprecedented scale and technological prowess, according to both supporters and critics of the legislation.

Overshadowed by the public focus on new Internet surveillance and "roving wiretaps" were numerous obscure features in the bill that will enable the Bush administration to make fundamental changes at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency and several Treasury Department law enforcement agencies.

Known as the U.S.A. Patriot Act, the law empowers the government to shift the primary mission of the FBI from solving crimes to gathering domestic intelligence. In addition, the Treasury Department has been charged with building a financial intelligence-gathering system whose data can be accessed by the CIA.

Most significantly, the CIA will have the authority for the first time to influence FBI surveillance operations inside the United States and to obtain evidence gathered by federal grand juries and criminal wiretaps.

"We are going to have to get used to a new way of thinking," Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff, who is overseeing the investigation of the Sept. 11 attacks, said in an interview. "What we are going to have is a Federal Bureau of Investigation that combines intelligence with effective law enforcement."

The new law reflects how profoundly the attacks changed the nation's thinking about the balance between domestic security and civil liberties. The bill effectively tears down legal fire walls erected 25 years ago during the Watergate era, when the nation was stunned by disclosures about presidential abuses of domestic intelligence-gathering against political activists.

The overwhelming support in Congress shows that the nation's political leadership was persuaded that intelligence-gathering can no longer be restricted by the reforms that emerged out of a landmark 1975 Senate investigation.

After wading through voluminous evidence of intelligence abuses, a committee led by Sen. Frank Church warned that domestic intelligence-gathering was a "new form of governmental power" that was unconstrained by law, often abused by presidents and always inclined to grow.

One reform that grew out of the Church hearings was the segregation within the FBI of the bureau's criminal investigation function and its intelligence-gathering against foreign spies and international terrorists.

The new anti-terrorism legislation foreshadows an end to that separation by making key changes to the law underpinning it, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978.

"They have had to divide the world into the intelligence side and law enforcement," Chertoff said. The new law "should be a big step forward in changing the culture."

FISA allows the FBI to carry out wiretaps and searches that would otherwise be unconstitutional. Unlike regular FBI criminal wiretaps, known as Title IIIs, the goal is to gather intelligence, not evidence. To guard against abuse, the attorney general had to certify to a court that the "primary purpose" of the FISA wiretap was to listen in on a specific foreign spy or terrorist.

In negotiating the new legislation, the Bush administration asked for a lower standard for approval -- changing the words "primary purpose" to "a purpose." This would allow people merely suspected of working with terrorists or spies to be wiretapped.

The debate over this wording was one of the fiercest surrounding the new anti-terrorism law. Senate negotiators settled on the phrase "a significant purpose," which will still allow the Bush administration the leeway it wants, according toChertoff and others.

In passing the anti-terrorism law, congressional leaders were leery enough of the historical precedents to insist on a "sunset provision" that will cause the FISA amendment and other "enhanced surveillance" features to expire unless reenacted in 2005.

On the day the bill passed, Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) the Senate negotiator of the bill, said on the Senate floor that he had reluctantly "acquiesced" to the Bush administration's demands for anti-terrorism powers that could be used to violate civil liberties.

"The bill enters new and uncharted territory by breaking down traditional barriers between law enforcement and foreign intelligence," said Leahy, who is chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee.

Leahy said he expectedthe Justice Department to consult with the committee on any fundamental changes.

During the deliberations, Attorney General John D. Ashcroft characterized the anti-terrorism bill as a package of "tools" urgently needed to combat terrorism. The attorney general cut short his testimony before the Judiciary Committee, then declined to attend two additional Senate hearings for closer questioning.

Ashcroft declined to be interviewed for this story by The Washington Post.

The new law also gives the CIA unprecedented access to the most powerful investigative weapon in the federal law enforcement's arsenal: the federal grand jury. Grand juries have nearly unlimited power to gather evidence in secret, including testimony, wiretap transcripts, phone records, business records or medical records.

In the past, Rule 6(e) of the Rules of Federal Procedure required a court order whenever prosecutors shared federal grand jury evidence with other federal agencies.

The new law permits allows the FBI to give grand jury information to the CIA without a court order, as long as the information concerns foreign intelligence or international terrorism. The information can also be shared widely throughout the national security establishment.

"As long as the targets are non-Americans, they now can sweep up and distribute, without limitation, the information they gather about Americans," said Morton Halperin, a leading member of the civil liberties community and co-author of a legal text on national security law.

As a legal matter, the CIA is still prohibited from exercising domestic police powers or spying on U.S. citizens. However, its intelligence officers will work side by side with federal agents who do have arrest and domestic investigative authority.

Sen. Bob Graham (D-Fla.), chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said the changes are long overdue and necessary to address the new terrorist threat.

"We are dealing with the issue of the empowerment of the Director of Central Intelligence," said Graham, who said he will carefully monitor how the new powers are used.

The new counterterrorism powers given to Treasury agencies breach another wall of the Church reforms, which consolidated domestic intelligence-gathering inside the FBI to ensure accountability. Treasury's expanded domestic intelligence role concerns some officials.

"I don't see how that is going to work," a senior U.S. official said. "I am worried about it -- I think we are getting an overreaction."

Technology is the key to harnessing the last and largest piece of the new domestic intelligence-gathering system, the nation's 600,000 police officers and detectives. In the new terrorism bill, Congress authorized a secure, nationwide communications system for the sharing of terrorism-related information with local police.

"Terrorists are a hybrid between domestic criminals and international agents," Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), a strong proponent of the bill, said in floor debate on Oct. 11.

"We must lower the barriers that discourage our law enforcement and intelligence agencies from working together to stop these terrorists. These hybrid criminals call for new hybrid tools."

----

FBI Pleads for Help on Attacks
Mueller Seeks Break in Anthrax, Sept. 11 Terror Cases

By Dan Eggen and Susan Schmidt
Washington Post Staff Writers
Saturday, November 3, 2001; Page A09
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A32655-2001Nov2?language=printer

FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III pleaded for help yesterday in finding those responsible for the deadly anthrax mailings and accomplices in the Sept. 11 terror attacks, acknowledging that cash reward offers and other steps have failed to lead to important breakthroughs in either case.

Mueller, indicating that investigators have few major clues in either case, asked the public "to join us in trying to bring leads to the front that will help us solve both the anthrax investigation, [and] the September 11th hijacking investigation."

His remarks were the strongest sign yet of the difficulties federal investigators have encountered as they grapple with two complex criminal cases and the massive effort to thwart future terrorist attacks.

Nearly two months after Middle Eastern terrorists flew hijacked jetliners into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and a field in Pennsylvania, killing nearly 4,600 people, prosecutors have detained more than 1,100 people but have charged no one with complicity in the plot.

The handful of possible suspects in U.S. custody have refused to cooperate with authorities, and three men who allegedly helped plan the attacks in Germany are presumed to be in hiding in Afghanistan or Pakistan.

"What we need is a source," said one senior law enforcement official. "This is a very big puzzle, and you've got to have somebody giving you a hand on how big the pieces are and what color they are and how they fit together. It's a time when we're catching our breath and trying to figure out where to go from here."

In the bioterror attacks, which began six weeks ago with letters containing anthrax spores mailed to two New York news outlets, Mueller and other federal officials say they have no likely suspects and have yet to determine with certainty whether the mailings are connected to foreign or U.S. sources. Four people have died from anthrax infections.

Mueller said yesterday that investigators are "not tilting more to a domestic source" but noted that all of the evidence so far is centered on the United States. Other senior officials have repeatedly said they believe the mailings likely have their origins in the United States.

Investigators have found no latent fingerprints, hairs, clothing fibers or other forensic evidence on the three known envelopes and letters sent to NBC News, the New York Post and Senate Majority Leader Thomas A. Daschle (D-S.D.), officials said. In addition, Mueller said a $1 million reward in the case announced on Oct. 18 has not resulted "in as many tips or leads . . . as we would like."

In the hijackings probe, FBI and Justice Department officials stressed that they have assembled a remarkably detailed portrait of the 19 dead hijackers' travels in the United States and have made great progress chronicling their foreign travel as well. Investigators have also identified more than $500,000 from overseas that helped finance the plot.

But law enforcement officials acknowledge privately that they have made little progress in identifying and capturing living conspirators in the Sept. 11 plot.

Three men in custody who appear most suspicious to U.S. authorities are not cooperating. Another man alleged to have helped train the hijackers is fighting extradition from Britain.

Three suspects named by Attorney General John D. Ashcroft as likely conspirators in the plot -- Said Bahaji, Ramzi Binalshibh and Zakariya Essabar -- have not been found despite warrants for their arrest issued by German officials. The three were allegedly part of a terrorist cell in Hamburg that included three of the hijackers.

One senior FBI official said yesterday that most of the bureau's biggest cases have been solved through sources who can help investigators understand how evidence fits together. He noted that long-term terrorism probes, such as those into the bombings at the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia and at two U.S. embassies in East Africa -- can take years to jell.

"We don't have a source telling us who the mastermind was," the official said. "Everything we got is from connecting the dots of credit cards and intercepts and that sort of thing. Analysis only gets you so far."

One Justice Department official urged patience, saying a big break or arrest could come at any time. "In every investigation, you have breaks and you have periods where you run into a lot of blind alleys," the official said.

Avery Mann, a spokesman for the "America's Most Wanted" television program, said the show has received more than 700 tips about the anthrax letters in two weeks, including 200 yesterday after Mueller's request for help. The show has received more than 4,500 calls about the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The hot line number is 1-800-CRIMETV.

In the anthrax cases, early hopes that investigators would quickly pinpoint where the letters were mailed have faded.

But one senior official said yesterday that authorities think they have identified the likely postal route along which the letters, postmarked in Trenton, N.J., were mailed. The route is not the one that investigators scoured two weeks ago, when a mail carrier, Teresa Heller, developed cutaneous anthrax.

The FBI has also been gathering information from university and commercial laboratories around the country that conduct research on anthrax. Investigators have been using subpoenas issued by a federal grand jury in West Palm Beach, Fla., near American Media Inc., the site of the first anthrax contamination.

A 1996 law required all U.S. laboratories that distribute the B. anthracis bacterium to other labs to register with the federal government. But there is no registry of laboratories or other facilities that simply house the bacteria for their own research.

Among the facilities that have been subpoenaed was Louisiana State University, home to one of the world's largest living collections of B. anthracis. Despite its size, that collection has a limited number of specimens that belong to the Ames strain, which authorities have said was present in all of the recent U.S. bioterror incidents.

"They wanted to know what cultures we had and what visitors we'd had in the last couple of years," said Martin Hugh-Jones, an anthrax researcher at LSU.

Another LSU official said the subpoena also asked for personnel records of employees and records of any transfers of strain samples to other laboratories. Such transfers are regulated by the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta.

Staff writer Rick Weiss contributed to this report.

----

States Devising Plan for High-Tech National Identification Cards

By Robert O'Harrow Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, November 3, 2001; Page A10
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A32717-2001Nov2?language=printer

State motor vehicle authorities are working on a plan to create a national identification system for individuals that would link all driver databases and employ high-tech cards with a fingerprint, computer chip or other unique identifier.

The effort by the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, which would take several years to implement if approved by state and federal authorities, follows disclosures that some of the Sept. 11 hijackers used false identities or obtained driver's licenses fraudulently.

Association leaders assertedat a meeting last week that driver's licenses "have become the 'de facto' national identification card used by law enforcement, retailers, banks and other establishments requiring proof of identification."

The group pledged to work closely with the new Office of Homeland Security, the Justice Department and federal authorities. The motor vehicle officials have proposed standardizing the driver's license process and linking databases before, but on a voluntary basis.

The new proposal would seek to make such changes mandatory, an official said.

Under the proposal, every state would continue to issue driver IDs. But every license and non-driver identity card would contain the same basic information and a similar set of security features to prevent tampering and fraud, association officials said yesterday.

"There's no need to create a new national ID card," said Jason King, the group's spokesman. "Let's just make what we have better."

The idea of a national ID card arouses fierce opposition among civil libertarians, both conservative and liberal, who believe a card would be used by government authorities to track individuals without their permission.

But public sentiment shifted after the terror attacks. One survey found that 70 percent of those questioned favored requiring citizens to carry a national identification card of the sort used in other countries.

The supporters do not include President Bush, who, an aide said, is not seriously considering the creation of such a card. But some lawmakers, technology specialists and others have begun promoting the idea as a way to identify terrorists and cut down on identity crimes.

Rep. George W. Gekas (R-Pa.), head of the House subcommittee on immigration and claims, opposes a national ID. But since the attacks, he believes that "members of Congress just can't throw the idea out without giving it some consideration," a spokesman said.

Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), who chairs the Senate Judiciary Committee's panel on technology, terrorism and government information, also has expressed interest in a national ID card.

Yesterday she announced the introduction of legislation that would require foreign nationals to use high-tech visa cards containing a fingerprint, retinal scan or other unique identifier. It also would create a centralized "lookout database" containing information about known terrorists and other U.S. visitors deemed threatening.

Larry Ellison, chief executive of Oracle Corp., the world's largest database software maker, said last month that he would donate software to make it possible for the government to create a national ID card system to improve airport security.

Civil liberties activists said such a system would be costly and difficult to implement and would greatly ease the tracking of innocent citizens by creating a single identifier.

"It will be easier for companies and governments to track people. The question is, do we want that?" asked Robert Gellman, an attorney and privacy specialist in the District. "Will it really help in the fight against terrorism?"

Security specialists warn that technical hurdles to creating such a system are enormous. Once created, such IDs likely would be widely used to collect information about individuals, they said, and the databases containing that information might become targets of hackers.

"There are lots of flaws in software. It may create a false sense of security," said David Banisar, a research fellow at the Harvard Information Infrastructure Project. "There are all sorts of practical questions at the get-go."

Officials with the motor vehicle administrators organization said they understand the concerns about civil liberties. But they said the recent attacks -- and loopholes in the security of state driver ID systems -- demonstrate the need for changes.

Four of the hijackers who crashed American Airlines Flight 77 into the Pentagon exploited a legal loophole to obtain Virginia driver's licenses, though they did not live in the state. Under Virginia law, drivers had only to present a notarized residency form, cosigned by a state resident, and a notarized identity form cosigned by a lawyer.

In an Oct. 1 letter, the association president, Linda R. Lewis, asked that the General Accounting Office consider a study of the benefits of using "national databases maintained by motor vehicle agencies in the fight against terrorists and the enhancement of homeland security."

Lewis said the current system for issuing and tracking driver's licenses needs to be improved. "We've got to do something. The system isn't working as well as it should," she said. "The times have shown national security has got to be paramount."

----

National Guard to Be Deployed Outside Capitol

Associated Press
Saturday, November 3, 2001; 9:41 AM
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A34480-2001Nov3?language=printer

An overworked U.S. Capitol police force is going to get some help from the National Guard.

The plan calls for about 100 National Guard troops to be posted around the Capitol beginning next week.

It's the the fourth time in history that troops will protect the building.

Since the terrorist attacks, Capitol police have been working six-day weeks of at least 12 hours a day.

All leave has been canceled and plans to give them training in anti-terrorism tactics have been postponed indefinitely.

The Guard troops will be stationed on the periphery of the Capitol complex.

Lawmakers want to avoid the appearance of a government under siege.

-------- spying

Spy Trials Challenge New Russia
Critics Fear Return To Obsession With Internal Security

By Sharon LaFraniere
Washington Post Foreign Service
Saturday, November 3, 2001; Page A23
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A33075-2001Nov2?language=printer

MOSCOW, Nov. 2 -- Igor Sutyagin's wife says the white folders that crowd the unfinished wooden bookshelves in their two-room apartment hold nothing but thousands of newspaper articles on the Russian military that her husband has dutifully cut out since the mid-1980s.

Federal Security Service agents who raided the apartment in 1999, though, had a very different view. They claimed the folders contained proof of espionage, accusations that have kept Sutyagin in prison for the past two years.

On Thursday, as Sutyagin's trial drew to a close in Kaluga, a town about 100 miles south of Moscow, government prosecutors demanded he be convicted and imprisoned for 14 more years.

In a country that insists it is moving determinedly away from the arbitrariness of the Soviet years and toward the rule of law, Igor Sutyagin, 37, represents a conundrum. A researcher at the Institute for the Study of the United States and Canada, one of Moscow's best-known research organizations, he stands accused of spying, a charge that his colleagues, human rights activists and many Western observers believe to be bogus.

And he has company. Sutyagin is one of three Russians accused of espionage in what human rights activists describe as dubious cases. A physicist from the Siberian city of Krasnoyarsk faces up to 20 years in prison; a career diplomat from Moscow, sentenced to four years in prison, is appealing his conviction.

Critics fear the trials presage a disturbing renewal of Russia's fixation with internal security. At least, they add to the growing nervousness among Russian intellectuals about whether President Vladimir Putin, in his drive to establish order after years of political, legal and economic chaos, is giving the country's security services too much freedom.

"These cases are the kind of thing that worry people a lot," said Robert Nurick, director of the Carnegie Endowment's Moscow Center. "I sense a kind of self-censorship. It's not dramatic, but there is a sense that the limits of what is permissible are coming in again, and people are not sure how far. That has produced a kind of a caution."

The anxiety is tempered by some signs that the Kremlin wants to protect civil rights. Pushed by Putin, the Russian legislature is poised to adopt a new criminal code that grants defendants accused of serious crimes the right to jury trials. While prosecutors would retain much of their extensive powers, the code would require that search and arrest warrants be issued by judges.

Still, said Ernest Chyorny, a human rights activist, the proposed code is just a piece of paper, yet to be adopted and at least a year away from taking effect. "The reality is very far from all these codes," he said.

Chyorny is the Moscow representative of a human rights group founded by Alexander Nikitin, who fought treason charges for five years after he exposed the radiation hazards of Russia's nuclear submarines. The former navy captain was acquitted last year, as were two other recently accused spies. U.S. businessman Edmond Pope was convicted but pardoned by Putin.

Chyorny argues that espionage cases have picked up momentum under Putin, who formerly headed the Federal Security Service (FSB), a successor to the Soviet KGB, which also employed Putin. "What is important here is that FSB agents have started to feel freer," Chyorny said. "There is no proof in any of these cases. We are talking about complete arbitrariness. If the society does not react, it can snowball."

By Western standards, a Russian espionage trial is a highly mysterious affair. Proceedings are closed, prosecutors are notoriously tight-lipped and evidence is never made public. The only information about what takes place behind courtroom doors comes from defense attorneys and relatives of the accused.

Thursday, for instance, the Interfax news agency reported the prosecution's demand that Sutyagin serve 14 years in prison with this elaboration: "The prosecutor substantiated his demand by the materials of the case examined in court."

For Russian scholars and scientists, some of whom need work from foreign firms to feed their families, the secrecy makes it harder to figure out what is acceptable and what could land them in prison.

"There is just no clear regulation on what information is treated as a state secret," said Irina Manannikova, Sutyagin's wife and an unemployed mathematician. "I myself do not understand. The investigators told me that Igor did not have the right to take information from 10 different public sources and prepare a general review. This is incredible, but this is what is going on now."

Sutyagin's attorneys say he is accused of publishing classified information about Russia's nuclear weapons in a book and in reports to a London-based defense consulting firm, Alternative Futures, that hired him as a part-time consultant.

Anna Stavitskaya, one of Sutyagin's lawyers, said FSB experts testified that the firm had all the earmarks of a CIA front. Sutyagin can prove he drew all the information from public sources, she said, but that does not ensure his acquittal.

"I cannot imagine anything more absurd than this," she said. "This is a kind of warning to scholars, for them to think less. I think the FSB is anxious to show its work. They are unable to find real spies, so they create artificial ones."

Like Sutyagin, Valentin Danilov landed a freelance contract with a foreign company. A 53-year-old thermal physicist, he earned less than $52 a month as head of a department in a state research institute in the Siberian city of Krasnoyarsk. His wife, Tamara, said a Chinese company hired him to analyze the effect of space particles on satellites.

She said that a local FSB official gave him verbal permission to do the work and that she asked him why he didn't try to get written permission. He answered that "the FSB is the kind of agency you do not want to deal with very often, she said."

During 10 months in prison, her husband's weight has dropped from 165 pounds to 121 pounds, she said. Interviewed in his cell, the 6-foot-tall scientist told one reporter bitterly: "I did scientific research for more than 30 years and no doubt contributed some useful work to my country. And my reward is an accusation of treason."

Danilov's case is being heard by a judge and two citizens who are supposed to have some say in the verdict. When one of the citizen jurors announced that Danilov's case should be thrown out, both were replaced at the prosecutor's insistence, Tamara Danilova said.

Another accused spy, Valentin Moiseev, also faced a changing courtroom cast. A career diplomat, Moiseev, 55, was accused of giving a South Korean diplomat secret information about Russia's arms deals.

After his conviction was overturned, three judges heard his case in turn. Each failed to appear on the day when the verdict was to be rendered, said Moiseev's wife, Natalya. Finally a fourth judge sentenced him to four years.

Chyorny, the human rights activist, said one of the documents that Moiseev allegedly handed over to the South Koreans was a draft agreement between Russia and North Korea on the protection of birds.

-------- terrorism

Crackdown Expanded to All Groups in Terror List

By Alan Sipress
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, November 3, 2001; Page A18
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A32587-2001Nov2.html

The Bush administration has tightened the financial squeeze on 22 foreign groups deemed to be terrorist organizations, including Hamas and Hezbollah, applying the same stiff measures already imposed on those suspected of having links to Saudi exile Osama bin Laden.

All of the groups covered by yesterday's announcement were already on the State Department's list of foreign terrorist organizations, which requires U.S. financial institutions to freeze their assets and makes it illegal to offer them support. Now, the administration will be able to take wider action against those who back the groups and to deny access to U.S. financial markets to foreign banks that do not cooperate in the crackdown.

The action subjects these militant groups to the broader measures imposed in recent weeks by the administration on organizations and individuals affiliated with bin Laden's al Qaeda network in response to the Sept. 11 attacks in New York and Washington. The groups affected by this latest initiative have not been directly connected to bin Laden.

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell applied the broader measures to these groups after the administration faced criticism from pro-Israel lobbyists and Israel's sympathizers in Congress that the United States had a double standard on terrorism. Administration officials have said in recent weeks that they intended to impose the harsher penalties on anti-Israel groups but wanted to move initially against the al Qaeda cadres.

"The president, I think, has made clear that al Qaeda is the first organization that we're going after, but it's not the only terrorist organization," said State Department spokesman Richard A. Boucher.

The groups affected by the announcement yesterday include not only anti-Israel organizations such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Outfits active well outside the Middle East and South Asia -- such as the Basque separatist group ETA, the Real Irish Republican Army and three Colombian militant groups -- are also covered.

Six of the 28 groups on the State Department's terrorist list were already covered by the tougher measures because of their suspected links to bin Laden. The organizations covered by yesterday's announcement represent the balance of those on the department's list.

"Everybody is covered by one set of financial steps," Boucher said.

----

FEMA Establishes Center in District

By Spencer S. Hsu
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, November 3, 2001; Page B4
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A32590-2001Nov2?language=printer

The Federal Emergency Management Agency has established an emergency operations center in the District to prepare for a catastrophic attack on the nation's capital, agency officials told a congressional panel yesterday.

Alarmed by the chaos following September's terrorist attacks and stung by criticism from Congress, District and federal officials have also overhauled the city's emergency preparedness plans to copy the federal model.

FEMA has bolstered its capacity to rush food, medicine, heavy equipment, communications gear and hazardous material cleanup crews to the capital region in case of mass casualties from a terrorist or other criminal act, said Assistant Director Kenneth S. Kasprisin, who testified before the House Government Reform subcommittee on the District, which is investigating preparedness around the city.

After the hearing, FEMA representative Michael Lowder said: "This is to support the District's efforts, not to supplant them. We are trying to anticipate the event of an attack here in the District of Columbia so that we are better prepared here, and the District is helped, too."

The District's emergency officials will still be in charge of the immediate response to any disaster. But federal agencies will be better prepared to deploy within hours equipment, personnel and other resources for ongoing operations, such as providing shelter, medical treatment or decontamination.

FEMA officials declined to divulge the location of the emergency center or a backup site that has been set up.

Mayor Anthony A. Williams (D) welcomed the federal coordination but said the city also needs financial help.

"While I am satisfied that we are enhancing our organizational capacity to respond to emergencies, I am here to tell you that we don't have sufficient resources to respond to the full range of disasters we could face," Williams said.

Rep. Constance A. Morella (R-Md.), chairman of the subcommittee, called the hearing along with Del. Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-D.C.) to improve collaboration among more than a dozen federal agencies and 17 political jurisdictions.

Members sought to avoid a repeat of the confusion of Sept. 11. In the hours after the Pentagon was struck by a hijacked airliner, for example, the federal government ordered 350,000 workers to evacuate area offices at the same time that it sealed off the 14th Street bridge - both without consulting with the city government.

Since then, the FBI has begun daily conference-call briefings to area police agencies.

The House voted last month to withhold some federal funds until the District upgrades its emergency plans. Norton and city leaders have called for legislation to include the District in federal emergency planning and to give Williams the same power as the nation's governors to activate the National Guard, a request that now must go before the president.

"It is evident that there was no - and there is no - regional emergency plan, at least not one that can be counted on," Morella said. "These are not just academic concerns."

But District leaders warned that local police, fire, public health and road agencies remain desperately short of staff, equipment and training to deal with an attack that creates mass casualties.

Williams said he met this week with Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge to request representation at Ridge's new office. He also pleaded for a commitment to the city's request for $250 million in federal preparedness funds. The Bush administration has committed $25 million.

Without the extra money, the mayor said, the District would face a "nightmare game show" - having to choose among spending money to help medical officers respond to bioterrorism, to improve evacuation plans or to upgrade communication among other government agencies.

"Which door are you going to choose?" Williams asked.

Local, regional and federal representatives said that they were increasing coordination but that that still is not enough.

"If a more serious biological or chemical attack occurs, our hospitals are not prepared for a surge of inpatients," said Robert A. Malson, president of the D.C. Hospital Association. "It will take federal government assistance to provide the necessary resources."


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Berkeley resolution stirs threat of boycott

November 3, 2001
AP
http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20011103-78741548.htm

BERKELEY, Calif. (AP) - The cost of free speech may be going up in Berkeley.

This left-leaning city with a proud history of snubbing companies with questionable political ties is now the target of a threatened boycott over its stance on the war against terrorism.

In the two weeks since the City Council passed a resolution urging the government to stop bombing Afghanistan "as soon as possible," hundreds of people have called and sent e-mail vowing to boycott stores and restaurants.

Business owners say it will be some months before they can say with certainty whether the vote took an economic toll.

But the worry is real.

"It feels awful," said Mayor Shirley Dean, who was among the four council members who did not vote for the resolution. "My sense is that it's serious."

Miss Dean points to the nearly 900 e-mails and letters forwarded to the council this week, the overwhelming majority of which are negative. One writer vowed to "never, I repeat never, buy so much as a bottle of water from your city again."

Brij Misra, general manager of the Radisson Hotel Berkeley Marina, said he lost a banquet because organizers were angry about the vote. "We need to think locally before we act globally," he said.

The vote in question came Oct. 16 when five of the more liberal council members urged the government to "break the cycle of violence" and end the roots of oppression that "tend to drive some people to acts of terrorism."

The four other members abstained. The council also condemned the September 11 attacks, grieved the mass murder of thousands of people that day and acknowledged the heroic response.

The vote was the council's latest foray into national politics. A few years ago, the city boycotted six oil companies for doing business with governments considered oppressive, and it criticized a seventh for its environmental record.

Now Berkeley could be on the receiving end.

Lee Jester, owner of the furniture store, Craftsman Home, said one customer complained but "God knows how many customers just never said anything, just stopped coming."

"I wish the City Council would just concern itself on city matters," he said.

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